This paper shows that when an executive has more policy expertise than the community that hired him, the particular institution used to monitor executive power is critical for promoting good performance. The contrast is between two basic accountability mechanisms: popular election of the executive (direct) and appointment by a popularly elected legislature (hierarchical). I develop a principal(s)-agent(s) model where a homogeneous community seeks to control a better informed executive in the face of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The model predicts, perhaps unintuitively, that in the presence of expertise asymmetry hierarchical control can improve executive performance to a larger extent than direct control. First, by insulating the executive from popular opinion, thus reducing the good types' incentive to pander to an uninformed public; and second, because the executive is made accountable to a more informed principal, the legislature, thus improving the quality of monitoring bad executive types. The superiority of hierarchical control over direct control is more evident when policy issues are complex (as opposed to simple) and when the legislature is independent of the executive. I present evidence from U.S. municipal elections during 1970-1999 supporting the theoretical prediction that elected executives will manipulate simple policy issues for electoral purposes more so than appointed executives.
1 Introduction utive incentives. It does not address the broader question of what is the comparative performance of each "system" of government. The reason to focus on the narrower question is twofold. (a) "Systems" that feature di¤erent accountability structures are distinct along other dimensions as well, for instance, di¤erent electoral rules (majoritarian vs. proportional), various checks and balances within government, di¤erent party systems, di¤erent transparency requirements etc. These are hard to incorporate in a single model. (b) My goal is to understand the causal (ceteris paribus) e¤ect of the accountability structure on executive incentives; to achieve this I keep constant all other parameters of the game: players, their preferences, and the information structure, and vary only the accountability structure. Then I compare executive behavior (and not voter welfare) in each institutional setting.
The main message of this paper is that hierarchical control of an expert executive can improve executive performance to a larger extent than direct control. This …nding seems counterintuitive if we adopt the view commonly expressed in the political science literature (Manin et al. 1999) namely that direct electoral control is the single most e¤ective tool for improving accountability. According to this view any further link in the chain of delegation between voters and the executive can only weaken the (already imperfect) control that voters are able to impose, and therefore can only adversely a¤ect executive accountability. The model that I analyze shows that this type of argument underplays a central feature of political delegation: the asymmetry of information between government and the public. 4 If the government is indeed better informed than the public then my theory points to the following four arguments that should enter the discussion of alternative accountability structures for an executive.
First, an accountability mechanism must not only ensure that the executive is controlled, but it should also allow the executive enough discretion to pursue policies that are the public interest even if they go against current public opinion. 5 These two objectives, control and discretion, are obviously in con ‡ict with one another; so the question becomes which accountability mechanism strikes a better balance between the two. In general, direct elections are better at controlling the executive, while appointment is better at allowing him more discretion i.e. insulating him from public opinion. A main result of the paper says that when voters are poorly informed discretion is relatively more important and therefore appointment is a better institution than elections. Second, delegating the task of monitoring the executive to the legislative branch, although weakening the extent of executive control, will improve the quality of that control because the legislative branch is a better informed principal than the public. More exactly, executives who are controlled directly by voters often choose to pander to voters while an executive who is controlled by a better informed (and, preferably, independent) legislature sometimes chooses to represent voters'interests faithfully; although this latter behavior is less frequent, due to the possibility that the legislature itself may not share voters'preferences, it is clearly better for voters than pandering.
Third, in order for hierarchical control to fully perform its "executive insulation" function voters must view their indirect control agent, the legislature, as being independent of the executive. If voters perceive that the two branches have similar motivations then they will hold the two agents accountable for each other's actions and so even under hierarchical control the executive becomes responsive to popular opinion in order to help keep in power the legislature that appointed it.
Fourth, how well hierarchical control does depends on the type of policy issue: an important distinction seems to be between simple and complex issues. Simple issues are those about which the public has relatively strong feelings about the optimal policy. For instance, in a large city where crime has been a problem for some time most voters may think that hiring extra police is always the optimal thing to do. Complex issues are those for which voters are less con…dent in their gut feelings about what the government should do. In general I …nd that for simple issues hierarchical control does better when the executive's reelection concerns are strong, but direct control does better if reelection concerns are weaker; this is because the discretion allowed by hierarchical control is only going to produce better outcomes than pandering when the executive is strongly motivated to hold o¢ ce for its own sake. For complex issues hierarchical control always improves executive incentives more e¤ectively than direct control, since under hierarchical control voter passivity can be compensated for by delegating the power to dismiss the executive to a better informed assembly.
The theory presented in this paper is related to two di¤erent literatures in political economics: political agency under asymmetric information (Besley 2006 ) and constitutional rules (Persson and Tabellini 2003) . Several recent contributions to the political agency literature explicitly model the government's expertise advantage in a principal-agent framework with adverse selection and moral hazard. The main insight of these papers, that sets them apart from the earlier contributions (Barro 1973 , Ferejohn 1986 ) where the government had no expertise advantage, 6 is that reelection concerns may actually work against voters' interests because they can lead even politicians who share voters' preferences to behave opportunistically by pandering to public opinion. 7 The risk that direct elections may distort the incentives of even well-meaning politicians calls into question the desirability of making public o¢ cials directly accountable to the electorate and points to the relevance of alternative accountability structures. 8 Addressing this issue, Maskin and Tirole (2004) …nd that when reputational concerns drive the behavior of elected politicians representative democracy does worse for voters than other institutions such as direct democracy, if voters are moderately ignorant, and even appointed courts (unaccountable, in their model), if voters are very ignorant. Smart and Sturm (2004) demonstrate that a solution for mitigating the negative e¤ects of direct electoral accountability is to limit politicians'tenure in o¢ ce. This measure would reduce politicians'reelection concerns by reducing the value of holding o¢ ce. The resulting e¤ect is more truthful incumbent behavior and thus better selection.
By rigorously modeling informational asymmetries the political agency literature has been able to precisely identify positive as well as negative e¤ects of electoral accountability. However, it has limited itself to modeling government as a single agent, and so it cannot capture accountability structures that are more complex than a simple election, such as the (highly pervasive) hierarchical structure introduced above. It is conceivable that these other institutions have signi…cant e¤ects on behavior and outcomes, as the recent research on constitutional rules has argued (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2003) . In Persson et al. (1997) separation of powers (i.e. the division of tax and spending powers between two branches of government) and the executive's accountability structure work together for voters by setting the branches against each other in order to contain rent seeking. 6 Banks and Sundaram (1993) , for instance, present a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where voters'retrospective voting rule performs its two bene…cial e¤ects: disciplining incumbents and selecting better politician types. In their model elections do not exert their distorting e¤ect on the behavior of good types because public opinion coincides with the public interest. 7 Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) characterize another type of electoral distortion created by this informational asymmetry namely a reelection-seeking executive enacts a policy that is both unpopular and expected to be contrary to voters' interests but whose e¤ects are very likely to be known before elections; they call this distortion "fake leadership." 8 Many U.S. states do not allow for the direct election of judges or regulators in part to prevent this type of incentive problem.
By comparison, my model is narrower in that it isolates the e¤ect of the accountability structure on executive performance, by abstracting from any other institutional di¤erences, and also more general in that it fully accounts for informational asymmetries. 9 My model also contributes to theories of political accountability in formal political science (Przeworski et al. 1999 ). Here, as in the political agency literature, the focus has been on direct elections as a mechanism of accountability and little work -none of it formal -has examined alternative accountability structures. 10 My theory suggests the following empirical hypothesis: more evident electoral cycles in salient policy measures produced by directly controlled executives compared to those controlled hierarchically. I test this hypothesis with new panel data from municipal elections in 119 historically large U.S. cities during the period 1970-1999. 11 After controlling for economic, …scal and demographic determinants, as well as city and time …xed e¤ects, I …nd a relatively large and statistically signi…cant electoral cycle in police o¢ cer hiring in mayor-council cities; this pattern is absent in council-manager cities. The di¤erence in responsiveness is identi…ed in two ways: from combined cross section and time series variation in institutions, and from time series variation alone, i.e. from cities that switched from one form of government to another. The most conservative of the estimated di¤erences in responsiveness to elections is 2 percentage points a year; the largest is about 8 percentage points.
To my knowledge no other paper has yet looked at how U.S. city executives di¤er in their responsiveness to local elections. My results are related to evidence suggesting that other public o¢ cials, such as judges and regulators, behave di¤erently when they are elected vs. when they are appointed. For instance, Hanssen (1999) …nds that in U.S. state courts litigation rates are higher in those states that appoint judges compared to states where judges are elected. In a similar vein, Besley and Payne (2003) argue that in U.S. states where judges are elected discrimination charges are …led at a higher rate. They attribute this …nding to a stronger incentive of elected judges to decide in the complainant's favor. In the area of regulation, Besley and Coate (2003) present evidence that in U.S. states where regulators are elected by citizens electricity prices paid by retail consumers are signi…cantly lower. 12 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework within which I model the two basic mechanisms of control under adverse selection and moral hazard. I start with the case of independent assembly and executive types. In section three I analyze the model under the assumption that at elections time the electorate and the assembly are uncertain about the optimality of past executive actions. In section four I show that the results are robust to information becoming available before elections. Section …ve explores the e¤ects of partisanship on executive accountability in a hierarchical accountability structure. Section six discusses the data as well as the empirical speci…cation and estimation technique and reports the estimation results. The last section concludes with a discussion of possible extensions. 9 Abstracting from the agency relationship between public servants and the public, Alesina and Tabellini (2007) ask a complementary question: given that di¤erent accountability structures induce politicians to behave di¤erently from bureaucrats, what determines the socially optimal allocation of tasks between the two public servants? In my paper the incentives of elected and appointed executives are derived endogenously through their interaction with their principals.
1 0 Manin et al. (1999) summarize the contributions to a volume on political accountability this way: "the importance of the institutional structure of government [...] is a topic with regard to which we made little headway and where further research is de…nitely needed." 1 1 U.S. city governments are particularly suitable for testing the implications of my model due to the low incidence of partisan politics. 1 2 This is the only empirical contribution that actually presents a theory to explain elected vs. appointed behavior di¤erences: state governors who appoint regulators can get away with favoring a pro-industry apointee if this is not a salient issue for voters; in contrast, when voters elect a regulator directly they have the opportunity to choose a pro-consumer candidate.
The Theoretical Framework
I develop a two-period political agency environment in which voters exercise control over the government on the backdrop of uncertainty about the e¤ects of current policies and about the motivations of their representatives. Within this environment I model two institutions for monitoring the executive branch of government -popular election and appointment through a representative bodyand study executive performance under these alternative institutional arrangements. In what follows the term "government" collectively designates the two branches of government, the executive branch, or executive for short, and the legislative branch, or the assembly.
In each period t = 1; 2 there are two policy alternatives to the status quo Q; which we denote by A and B: The government, through its two branches, the executive and the assembly, determines the policy outcome of each period t, denoted byẑ t ; via a political process in which the executive acts as the agenda setter. Let z t stand for the policy proposal made by the incumbent executive in period t, where z t 2 fA; Bg ; and v t the decision of the legislative body of whether to approve (Y ) or block (N ) the executive's proposal, v t 2 fY; N g : Then the mapping that we assume to exist between policy proposals and votes, on the one hand, and policy outcomes, on the other, is simply:
namely at time t a proposal, or bill, becomes law, or policy outcomeẑ t , if and only if the assembly approves it, otherwise the status quo is preserved. In any given period the two policy alternatives may be either optimal or suboptimal. The period optimality of a policy alternative depends on the state of the world prevailing in that period; this state is denoted S t , with S t 2 fA; Bg : If in period t the policy alternative, or the policy outcome, is identical to the state we say that the policy, or outcome, is optimal; otherwise it is suboptimal.
The electorate has preferences over policy outcomes. In each period they receive a payo¤ of zero if the status quo obtains in that period, a payo¤ of one if the optimal policy is implemented and a payo¤ of negative one if instead the suboptimal policy is adopted. 13 Formally, voters'period payo¤ depends on the policy outcomeẑ t and the state S t and is constant across periods:
where I is an indicator function, i.e. a function that takes the value one if its argument is true and zero otherwise. Note that conditional on the state voters have a well de…ned ranking over policy outcomes. However, before the state is known voters can only have beliefs about their true ranking of these outcomes. Speci…cally we assume that the state is drawn at random and independently each period from a binary distribution that places probability p on state A, where 1 2 < p < 1. Thus, in the terminology of Maskin and Tirole (2004) , we may say that A is the popular policy outcome in the sense that, absent information about the state of the world, voters prefer in expectation that outcome A occurs.
The electorate delegates policy making to the executive and legislative branches of government. The legislative branch may be of one of two types a ; congruent (when a = 1) and noncongruent (when a = 1); the prior probability that the assembly is congruent is with 1 2 < < 1: 14 While 1 3 The assumption of a homogenous electorate implies that we are restricting attention to valence issues i.e. there is wide agreement among voters about the desired course of action. Con ‡icting preferences within the electorate raise additional considerations that are beyond the scope of this paper. 1 4 The probability of congruence can be interpreted in two ways. First, it is a summary measure of the quality, both types equally value reelection to a new term, which provides them with a positive ego rent R a ; they also care about policy issues. I assume that the two types are di¤erent in so far as congruent assemblies rank policy outcomes in the same order as voters do, whereas noncongruent types rank them in reverse order. Formally, the lifetime utility of an incumbent assembly of type a can be written as a function of policy outcomes and states of the world realized in the two periods:
where is a time discount factor, with 0 < 1; and a is the probability that the incumbent assembly is reelected for a new term. 15 The preferences of an incoming (second period) assembly of type a are represented by the utility function:
I also assume that the reelection concern dominates policy motivations for both types of assembly. Formally the assumption is that:
in words, the discounted value of reelection is larger than the payo¤ from having the ideal policy outcome today. 16 The executive branch of government similarly can be of one of the same two generic assembly types, congruent and noncongruent. 17 I denote the executive's type by the random variable e and assume it has the same (marginal) distribution as the assembly type a : With respect to the joint distribution of the two type variables I consider two polar cases. First, I assume that types are independent and second, that they are perfectly correlated. The second case captures a political environment with collusion between branches.
Because in the sequence of play to be laid out shortly the executive acts as the agenda setter it is natural to endow him with preferences over his own proposals. I can think about each type of executive as serving nonvoting constituencies with divergent interests by in ‡uencing the agenda of the government in their desired direction. Speci…cally in each period in which he is in o¢ ce the executive receives a random bene…t, or rent, X t (> 0) for introducing his constituency's preferred policy and a payo¤ of zero otherwise. The payo¤ X t is drawn each period independently from a probability distribution with cumulative distribution function G : (0; x M ) ! [0; 1] and mean E (X) = x: I also make the assumption that the distribution of executive private bene…ts has full or reputation, of the political class. Second, it captures the degree to which voters are able to distinguish congruent from noncongruent assemblies. For an approach to endogenizing the quality of politicians see Caselli and Morelli (2004) . The assumption that it is above a half captures in reduced form the idea that elections are fairly free and competitive and therefore a newly elected politician is more likely to be like voters than to be di¤erent from them. 1 5 The assumption that policy outcomes matter to politicians only when in o¢ ce is commonplace in the political agency literature. It may be interpreted as a legacy motivation: the politician cares that he will be remembered for outcomes that he himself had a role in bringing about. Besley (2006) o¤ers a comprehensive review of typical preferences and information structures underlying political agency models. 1 6 The primacy of the reelection concern in the behavior of legislators has been exploited elsewhere in the political science literature. Mayhew (1974) , for instance, makes a compelling case in favor of this basic motivation. A closely related, but technically more involved, assumption on assembly motivations can be that the relative intensity of preferences between reelection and policy goals is issue-dependent and therefore unknown to the assembly itself before a new period begins. Then assembly behavior will alternate between being ideological and reelection-focused depending on the realization of this intensity variable at the beginning of a period. Assuming these preferences does not however a¤ect the qualitative predictions on executive behavior, which is our main concern in this paper. 1 7 We choose to model each branch of government as a single player in order to astract from problems of preference aggregation, collective action and coordination that any collective agent potentially faces. Executive Legislative Elections Figure 1 : Timing: Direct Control of the Executive support and that the upper bound of this support is large enough -larger than the discounted expected payo¤ from being in o¢ ce in period two: x M > (R e + x); this insures that with positive probability the executive follows his own preferences thus making the agency problem su¢ ciently severe. I can then write the lifetime utility function of an executive of type e in compact form as follows.
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where is the time discount factor and e is the probability that the executive is reelected, or reappointed, to a new term. 18 The preferences of a challenger executive of type e are represented by the utility function:
I model the two institutions as distinct signaling games. The games are identical in every respect (including the information structure) except for who holds the power to remove the executive and when this power can be exercised. Under direct control the executive and the assembly are both popularly elected and cannot remove each other. 19 These features suggest the following sequence of play and information structure (see Figure 1) . At the beginning of period one the incumbent executive and assembly separately learn their own types; the executive also learns the state of the world S 1 and his bene…t draw X 1 : In the …rst policy stage the executive introduces one of two bills A or B; without observing the state or the executive's bene…t the assembly can then approve or block the executive's bill. After the policy stage but before elections the assembly and the electorate 1 8 Since the executive, through his control of the agenda, can prevent certain policy outcomes from being realized his preferences represented in equation (6) may also be regarded as ranking policy outcomes as well as policy proposals. For instance, if the executive is congruent he receives a payo¤ Xt if in period t the policy outcome is not the suboptimal policy and a payo¤ of zero otherwise. Thus he is indi¤erent between the optimal policy and the status quo and both are ranked above the suboptimal policy. 1 9 In the terminology of Shugart and Carey (1992) the two branches are characterized by separate origin (separate popular elections) and independent survival (…xed terms of o¢ ce for both executive and assembly). Voters observe the decisions made by the government in the …rst period, however they observe neither types nor the executive's private bene…t. In general elections for assembly and executive voters decide whether, and which of the two bodies, to reelect for a new term. At the beginning of period two the past period's state is common knowledge. If newly elected, the executive and assembly privately learn their types and the previous period's policy decisions. The current executive observes the state S 2 and bene…t X 2 and makes a proposal A or B: The assembly does not observe the state or the executive's bene…t and votes whether to approve or block the executive's bill. This ends the second policy stage and the game.
Elections
Under hierarchical control voters can directly elect the legislative branch which in turn has sole authority to appoint and dismiss the executive. The above extensive form changes to re ‡ect this important distinction (see Figure 2) . At the beginning of period one the incumbent executive and assembly privately learn their own types; the executive moreover observes the state of the world S 1 and his bene…t X 1 : In the …rst policy stage the executive introduces a proposal A or B; the assembly observes neither the state nor the executive's private bene…t and votes Yes or No on the proposal. After policy stage one and before elections the assembly may or may not learn the state S 1 : 21 If it does then the assembly votes on a no con…dence motion i.e. the assembly decides whether to retain the incumbent executive or else to appoint a challenger. Voters observe the executive's proposal and the assembly vote (or votes, if there has been a con…dence vote after the policy stage) but they do not learn types or the executive's bene…t X 1 : They may or may not learn the past period's state; if they do, the assembly must have also learnt it. Voters decide whether to give the assembly a new term. At the beginning of period two the past period's state is common knowledge. If newly elected, the challenger assembly observes its own type and all …rst period actions. The assembly, incumbent or challenger, subjects the executive to a vote of con…dence. If appointed, the challenger executive learns his type. The current executive observes the period state S 2 and his bene…t X 2 and makes a proposal A or B: The assembly, without observing the state or the executive's type and payo¤ may approve or reject the executive's proposal.
Finally, I specify strategies and beliefs using a uni…ed notation across the two baseline games. The incumbent executive's …rst period proposal strategy is a function of his information and type, denoted 1 (x; s; e ) : It will often be convenient to summarize the executive's behavior using the probability that he introduces the popular policy A de…ned as (s; e ) = P f 1 (X; s; e ) = Ag :
I let (z; a ) denote a type a assembly's mixed strategy for voting on policy. In order to simplify the exposition I do not introduce additional notation for second period proposal and voting strategies and thus omit the time subscripts on the functions and : Voters'reelection strategies are symbolized by a (z; v p ; v c j s) for the assembly, and e (z; v p ; v c j s) for the executive, where v p and v c are the votes cast by the assembly at the policy stage and con…dence stage, respectively. In the game of hierarchical control I let t (z; a j s) stand for the probability that in period t the incumbent executive is reappointed by the assembly. Without risking confusion I abuse notation and employ the same symbols for these strategies even when they are based on fewer observed actions. For instance, the function a (z; v p ) denotes the probability that the assembly is reelected by voters based only on the observed proposal and vote at the …rst policy stage. The meaning of each function will be clear from the context. I denote posterior beliefs about the period one state byp (z; v p ; v c ) : I also let
stand for the incumbent executive's, respectively assembly's, posterior reputation after a history (z; v p ; v c ; s). As the game progresses the assembly may be in a position in which it has more information about the executive for instance because they may learn period one's state S 1 before voters do. However, when types are independent and when assemblies and voters have received the same information at the same time they share the same posterior beliefs about the executive and the state.
The following language will be helpful in understanding the model. If the executive introduces the optimal policy in both states we say that the executive behaves optimally. When this behavior comes from a congruent executive it re ‡ects representation of voter preferences since the preferences of the two players are aligned. When this is instead the behavior of a noncongruent politician we can say it re ‡ects responsiveness to voter preferences because the executive follows voters'preferences instead of its own. If the executive introduces the popular policy in both states we say that it panders to public opinion because this behavior follows voters' ex ante preferences which may diverge from their true preferences. Finally, if the executive introduces the suboptimal policy in both states we say that it behaved suboptimally. When this behavior comes from a noncongruent executive it re ‡ects corruption because it follows the executive's private interest at the expense of the public interest. 22 The equilibrium concept chosen for my analysis is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (henceforth, PBE, or simply, the equilibrium). I require that strategies be optimal given beliefs and that beliefs be consistent, in the sense of satisfying Bayes's Rule, with equilibrium strategies at all information sets that are reached with positive probability via equilibrium actions.
As is common in retrospective voting games in which voters move after policies have been chosen my models feature multiple equilibria. In each case I characterize equilibria that maximize executive performance, 23 de…ned as the expected value to voters of executive proposals in the two periods:
where t is the executive's equilibrium proposal strategy in period t and S t is period t's state. The period components of executive performance
are measures of executive discipline and executive selection, respectively (see Besley 2006) . I select equilibria that maximize executive performance in order to capture the maximum extent to which each institution makes accountability possible. In order to compare the equilibrium outcomes of the two games I establish the following relation of dominance. Fix the vector of parameter values at (q; G). I say that game 0 (q; G) is weakly superior to game 00 (q; G) in terms of criterion ! at parameter vector (q; G) if the equilibrium outcome of game 0 (q; G) yields at least as high a value of the criterion as the equilibrium outcome of game 00 (q; G) : If the comparison value is strictly larger I say that game 0 (q; G) is strictly superior to game 00 (q; G) in terms of criterion !: Further, I say that game 0 (q) dominates game 00 (q) in terms of criterion ! at parameter vector q if game 0 (q; G) is weakly superior to game 00 (q; G) at all distributions G and game 0 (q; G) is strictly superior to game 00 (q; G) for at least one distribution G: In words, an institutional arrangement dominates another in terms of a given criterion if it does at least as well by this criterion no matter what beliefs voters might hold about the rent opportunities of politicians and does strictly better for at least one set of beliefs. In what follows my comparison criteria will be executive discipline, executive selection and executive overall performance.
Late-Term Accountability
In this section I characterize and then compare equilibrium behavior under direct and hierarchical control for the case in which the executive is certain that feedback on the optimality of his …rst period action arrives only after elections. The strategic situation implicit in this information structure is suggestive of decisions that a government seeking reelection has to make towards the end of an electoral term. For these "late-term" decisions the informational asymmetry between the executive, on the one hand, and the assembly and voters, on the other, is at its peak.
The results of this section are signi…cant in two ways. First, they provide a parsimonious formalization of the idea that a direct control mechanism is characterized by "temporal rigidity" (Linz 1994 ). The executive is elected for a …xed term and cannot be removed until the next elections even though his past behavior and recent information have revealed his incompetence or dissonance with the public interest. 24 This institutional feature lends direct control poor selection properties.
Second, my results suggest that making the executive responsible to an uninformed electorate can aggravate agency losses. This may occur through two channels. If voters are ex ante close to indi¤erent between policy alternatives -these issues are described below as complex -it may be rational for them to return the incumbent executive to o¢ ce regardless of its position on the issue, thus implicitly delegating control of the executive to the assembly; however, since the assembly cannot dismiss the executive, but can at most act to block its proposals, this type of electoral behavior leaves the executive unconstrained in its choice of policies and consequently leads to high levels of corruption. If voters are more con…dent that their own assessment of policy alternatives is correct -described below as simple issues -they demand that their ex ante preferred alternative be adopted; this electoral constraint, however, induces a strong bias in the preferences of (both congruent and noncongruent) executives in favor of the popular policy and results in opportunistic behavior and ine¢ cient outcomes. 25 By contrast, under hierarchical control the incentive to pander to public opinion is muted to the extent that con…dence votes will take place after the e¤ects of policies have been realized.
I now describe equilibrium behavior in the game of direct control with no feedback before elections. There are two possible types of executive behavior the occurrence of each depending on two parameters, voters' prior beliefs about the optimal alternative p, and politicians' initial reputation : If p is below a threshold p ( ) ; that is increasing in ; both executive types follow their preferences with probability one and voters reelect the executive with probability one no matter which policy alternative was introduced. I designate issues for which this type of equilibrium occurs as complex issues, because voters'behavior suggests that they do not know enough about the relative merits of policy alternatives in order for them to be able to send a clear message to the executive. The second type of equilibrium occurs when p is above the threshold p ( ) : At these parameter values both congruent and noncongruent executives introduce the popular policy A if they have strong reelection concerns and follow their preferences otherwise. This happens because voters'reelection strategies require that the popular policy be proposed and approved. Issues for which this second type of equilibrium occurs may be thought of as simple issues because voters are su¢ ciently con…dent that their assessment of policy alternatives is correct to condition the survival of the executive on promoting their ex ante preferred policy. I state these results formally in the next proposition, the proof of which is in the appendix. All results are understood to refer to behavior along the equilibrium path.
Proposition 1 Depending on the values of the parameters, two types of executive behavior can occur under direct control with no feedback.
(a) For complex issues congruent executives behave optimally, noncongruent executives behave corruptly and voters reelect the executive with probability one regardless of the policy introduced.
(b) For simple issues both congruent and noncongruent executives pander to the electorate if their private bene…t is below (R e + x) and follow their preferences otherwise; voters reelect the executive if and only if the popular policy A was introduced in period one.
To understand the logic behind this equilibrium it is useful to start with the incentives of the assembly. Assemblies care …rst and foremost about reelection. Voters thus can induce assemblies to vote on the proposal submitted by the executive as they themselves would have voted, by reelecting with a high probability those assemblies that follow voters'preferences. 26 Both assembly types then pool by voting in the required manner with equal probability. This pliant behavior is bene…cial 2 5 This pattern of executive behavior in the proximity of elections is consistent with studies which …nd that politicians seeking reelection become more representative of public opinion -though not necessarily of public interest -as the end of their term approaches. See, for instance, Rogo¤ and Siebert (1988) for voters in terms of obtaining the desired outcome, either the proposal or the status quo, but precludes a better selection of assembly types into the second period. The best that voters can do therefore is to employ a reelection strategy that guarantees their preferred outcome and this is possible by conditioning reelection of the assembly solely on the assembly vote.
Just as with their vote on the assembly, in their decision whether to reelect the incumbent executive voters act prospectively since at elections time they can no longer a¤ect the past period's outcome. Their objective in casting their second vote is to prevent a low quality executive from continuing in o¢ ce for another term. If the executive introduced the popular policy in period one voters'beliefs that the executive is congruent are reinforced because, on the one hand, they believe it is more likely that they are in state A and, on the other hand, it is congruent types that are most willing to propose A when this policy is optimal. Thus voters reelect the incumbent with probability one when the popular policy is introduced.
If the unpopular policy B is introduced, however, voters do not necessarily vote the executive out despite the fact that his reputation has weakened below that of his challenger:
Whether or not the executive is given a new term in this case depends on how valuable the information revealed through the executive's proposal is for second period voter welfare. To see this suppose the executive's period one proposal of B will completely reveal its type at the beginning of the second period when the state becomes known. 27 If this is the case then voters may …nd that on average they can expect a better second period outcome if they reelect since the assembly's knowledge of the executive's type improves its control of executive proposal power. The condition for this to happen de…nes the cuto¤ level p ( ) that separates complex from simple issues and is given by:
where~ e (B) is de…ned in equation (11) . 28 The left-hand side of the inequality in (12) is voters' expected payo¤ from reelecting an incumbent that proposed B and the right-hand side is their expected payo¤ from electing the challenger. 29 As long as condition (12) holds voters reelect the incumbent executive regardless of his behavior in o¢ ce in period one. This reelection rule, although generating complete separation of executive types within states -both types follow their preferences -does not achieve any screening of executives and thus results in an inferior equilibrium outcome in which there is neither correction of noncongruent executives'behavior in the …rst period, nor selection of congruent types in the second period. In e¤ect, what voters do in this equilibrium is to give up dismissal power altogether and rely only on the assembly's veto power.
When condition (12) does not hold voters' reelection rule takes a retrospective form: voters reelect the incumbent if and only if he introduces the popular policy A in period one. This rule creates the electoral incentive for both executive types to propose the popular policy regardless of 2 7 This happens whenever one type proposes A with probability one in state B: 2 8 Note that a necessary condition for this inequality to hold is~ e (B) 1 2 ; or equivalentlyp(B) 1 2 : In words, seeing an executive introduce the unpopular policy leads voters to believe that B is more likely the optimal policy. 2 9 If the incumbent executive continues in o¢ ce voters expect either the optimal policy, if the two branches are congruent, or the suboptimal policy, if both are noncongruent. If instead a new executive assumes o¢ ce, voters expect a change in status quo only if the assembly is congruent, because a noncongruent assembly blocks all initiatives of a new executive. the state; they do so whenever private bene…ts are smaller than their reservation value:
and follow their preferences otherwise. Compared to executive behavior in the …rst type of equilibrium, in this equilibrium noncongruent types behave better -since they choose the optimal policy with positive probability in state A -but this comes at the cost of distorting the incentives of congruent types. I now ask how the executive's incentives change at the end of the term when his survival depends on maintaining the continuous con…dence of an elected assembly. The next proposition establishes that when the executive is appointed, in sharp contrast to direct control, the end of the term produces no distortion in the behavior of congruent executive types. Moreover, it induces noncongruent types with strong reelection concerns to behave optimally as well.
Proposition 2 Under hierarchical control with no feedback congruent executives always represent voter preferences. Noncongruent executives are responsive when the private bene…t from following their preferences is smaller than (R e + x) and behave corruptly otherwise. At the con…dence vote stage congruent assemblies reappoint the executive if and only if his proposal at the …rst policy stage was optimal; noncongruent assemblies reappoint the incumbent executive regardless of his behavior in period one.
The key to understanding this equilibrium outcome is to observe that at the con…dence vote stage in period two the assembly, whether continuing from period one or newly elected, knows whether the incumbent executive's …rst period behavior was optimal, because period one's state is revealed right after elections. Moreover, at that stage it is also known that congruent executives are more likely to behave optimally than noncongruent types. Assembly posterior beliefs about the incumbent's type therefore satisfy:~
which implies that congruent assemblies will reappoint the executive if and only if his behavior was optimal whereas noncongruent assemblies strictly prefer to reappoint an executive whose behavior was suboptimal, but are indi¤erent between reappointing and dismissing an executive that behaved optimally. There are thus multiple equilibria depending on the choice of noncongruent assemblies at the con…dence vote stage. The equilibrium that maximizes executive performance is the one in which noncongruent assemblies do reappoint an executive that behaved optimally. This does not a¤ect second period outcomes, since the noncongruent assembly will block second period executive proposals anyway, but it does a¤ect …rst period payo¤s by giving noncongruent executives a stronger incentive to behave optimally. 30 At elections time voters act prospectively. Their goal is to improve the likelihood that the assembly of the second period is congruent. Since assembly and executive types are independent voters'only source of information about the incumbent assembly's type is assembly voting behavior at the policy stage (since there is no con…dence vote). Thus they condition reelection of the assembly exclusively on its …rst period vote. The assembly behavior that produces the best expected outcome 3 0 If a noncongruent assembly reappoints with probability an executive whose …rst period behavior is optimal then congruent executives will still follow their preferences while noncongruent executives are responsive whenever
which is increasing in :
for voters is then similar to that under direct control: assemblies approve with probability one the policy that voters favor and are reelected for doing so. The equilibria discussed above reveal signi…cant di¤erences in executive behavior under the two accountability structures. With direct control the executive acts unconstrained if issues are complex and has a strong incentive to pander to public opinion for issues that voters feel strongly about. By contrast, under hierarchical control we see that strong reelection concerns, X < (R e + x), induce optimal executive behavior; however, if reelection is relatively unimportant noncongruent executives will act corruptly. The threshold that determines noncongruent executives' decision to pursue reelection is below their reservation value because they can get away with nonoptimal behavior if the assembly is itself noncongruent.
First period executive behavior highlights the moral hazard correcting properties of each accountability mechanism. There is, however, a second dimension of voter control that is of equal importance, namely the extent to which each system prevents adverse selection. There generally is, however, an inherent tradeo¤ between the two goals. More discipline necessarily hinders selection because voters are less likely to be able to distinguish between types (Besley 2006 ). The e¤ective-ness of an accountability mechanism thus crucially depends on the particular manner in which this tradeo¤ is resolved.
The next proposition is the key theoretical result of the paper. It establishes that when there is no policy feedback hierarchical control either dominates direct control (it induces better executive performance for all rent distributions G) if the policy issue is complex, or there are tradeo¤s between the two (for some G's direct control does better, for others hierarchical control does better) if the policy issue is simple.
Proposition 3 With no feedback before elections:
(a) for complex policy issues hierarchical control dominates direct control both in terms of executive discipline and in terms of executive selection; (b) for simple policy issues hierarchical control dominates direct control both in terms of executive discipline and in terms of executive selection if and only if p : When p > neither institution is dominant by both criteria. In this case hierarchical control dominates direct control in terms of overall executive performance if voters' prior p is su¢ ciently small; if p is large then direct control creates better executive performance for moderate reelection concerns ( (R e + x) < X < (R e + x)), while hierarchical control produces better executive performance for strong reelection concerns (0 < X < (R e + x)).
The intuition for this result is the following. For complex issues hierarchical control always improves executive incentives more than direct control, since under hierarchical control voter passivity can be compensated for by delegating the power to dismiss the executive to a better informed assembly. For simple issues the advantage of hierarchical control is the discretion it allows the executive to act in the public interest. This does prevent pandering but reduces the extent to which noncongruent executives can be disciplined since they know they will not be dismissed if the assembly is noncongruent itself. Overall then, hierarchical control is going to produce better executive behavior compared to pandering to public opinion only when the executive is strongly motivated to pursue reelection for its own sake, because then disciplining is less of a problem.
If issues are complex the executive acts unconstrained under direct control and is reelected with probability one. Executive discipline and selection are then equal to the expected quality of a new executive: 31
Under hierarchical control there is pooling on optimal behavior if 0 < X < (R e + x) and complete separation otherwise. Discipline and selection are, respectively:
and
both strictly larger than the corresponding expressions under direct control. It is worth noting at this point that even when the executive's reelection concerns are moderate ( (R e + x) < X < (R e + x)), and consequently complete separation of types occurs under hierarchical control, selection is superior under this mechanism:
This failure of selection under direct control stems from the very institutional structure of direct delegation since it does not allow for the removal of the agent after elections even if his type has been completely revealed. The only check on executive power remains the willingness of the assembly to maintain the status quo. 32;33 For simple issues executive discipline and selection under direct control are, respectively:
Then H 1 > D 1 for all G if and only if p : Furthermore, when this condition holds it is also true that H 2 > D 2 for all G: When p > neither institution is dominant on both counts because if executive rents from outside o¢ ce are low (reelection concerns are strong), 0 < X < (R e + x) ; hierarchical control is superior in terms of discipline while if they are larger (reelection concerns are moderate),
(R e + x) < X < (R e + x) ; direct control is superior in terms of discipline. Intuitively if p is larger than it is better in expectation to have the politicians pander (resulting in an expected payo¤ of 2p 1) than to let politicians decide according to their preferences (which yields a payo¤ 2 1). For these parameter values pandering can be thought of as an intermediate form of responsiveness. 34 If p > direct control cannot be dominant in terms of overall executive performance because if the executive's reelection concerns are strong hierarchical control does strictly better by this criterion. However, hierarchical control can remain dominant in terms of overall executive performance if p is not too large because even if voters believe that reelection concerns are moderate hierarchical control can do at least as well as direct control overall due to its superior selection properties.
Accountability with Policy Feedback
In this section I compare executive incentives in the two accountability structures when policy issues arise earlier in the electoral term or, more generally, when the agenda of the government contains policy alternatives whose e¤ects are expected to be realized in a short period of time since their adoption. To capture this strategic situation I modify (in both games) the information structure of the preceding section by assuming that in period one, after the policy stage but before elections, the assembly learns the state with probability one and voters receive the same information with some …xed probability '; where 0 ' 1:
Allowing for the possibility that both principals are informed at elections time leads to several important new results. First, under direct control the incentive to pander to public opinion starts to lose its force because with positive probability voters will condition executive reelection on promoting the optimal, rather than the popular, policy alternative. However, opportunistic behavior vanishes completely only when voters are perfectly informed, ' = 1. Second, the superior information held by principals leads to an improvement both in discipline and in the selection of executives. I …nd that this improvement occurs faster under hierarchical control. If it is su¢ ciently likely that voters will become informed by elections time, hierarchical control produces an equilibrium outcome that functions as if voters were perfectly informed and directly controlled the executive themselves; under direct control this outcome occurs only if voters are perfectly informed. This result suggests that the hierarchical structure makes possible more control with less of a requirement for voters to become informed, in other words it economizes on voter information. Third, the normative comparative results from the no feedback case continue to hold and are even strengthened: if ' is su¢ ciently large hierarchical control dominates direct control for both complex and simple issues.
I start with the case of direct control. Executive behavior when issues are complex -de…ned by the condition p p ( ; ') -becomes more responsive than in the case of no feedback (cf. Proposition 1). Congruent executives still follow their preferences however noncongruent executives now also behave optimally with positive probability; the probability of optimal behavior is increasing in the quality of the government's performance measurement, captured by the parameter ': Moreover, now there is also some screening of noncongruent executives that improves the average quality of the executive serving in the second period. With simple issues the improvement in executive discipline takes the form of a decrease in the likelihood of opportunistic behavior by both types whose place is taken by optimal behavior. Pandering is no longer an electorally pro…table strategy for a congruent executive if ' exceeds a half, however the incentive to pander is still present, though weaker as ' becomes closer to one, for noncongruent types. Formally I have the following result.
Proposition 4 Consider the game of direct control with the possibility of an informed electorate. 3 4 The distinction between pandering and responsiveness is often blurred in the political agency literature. For instance Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) de…ne pandering as following centrist voters'preferences. We use the terminology of Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) and Maskin and Tirole (2004) as is apparent from the de…nitions given in section two.
(a) For complex issues congruent executives behave optimally; noncongruent executives behave optimally if private bene…ts are below ' (R e + x) and act corruptly otherwise. When voters do not have feedback they reelect the executive regardless of the alternative introduced; if they are informed they reelect conditional on optimal behavior; (b) For simple issues there are two cases. If feedback is slow, 0 ' < 1 2 ; congruent executives pander when
and behave optimally otherwise; noncongruent executives pander if
and behave corruptly otherwise. If feedback is faster, 1 2 ' 1; congruent executives behave optimally with probability one; noncongruent executives are responsive if
pander if
and are corrupt otherwise. Voters without feedback reelect the incumbent executive with probability one if the popular policy is introduced and with probability (< 1) if B is introduced; informed voters reelect the executive conditional on optimal behavior.
When voters have received feedback their unique best response is to reelect only those executives that behaved optimally in period one. To see this, consider the executive's payo¤ change caused by a deviation from proposing the suboptimal to proposing the optimal policy. For instance, in state A for an executive of type e it is (for state B the argument is completely symmetric):
where e (z j s) is the ex ante expected likelihood of reelection for an executive that makes proposal z in state s: 35 Note that the congruent type gains more by choosing A; since (A; 1) (A; 1) > 0; which implies, by the assumption of full support of the distribution of X; that the congruent type is strictly more willing to introduce the optimal policy, in this particular case A; than a noncongruent executive would be. 36 This implies that~ e (A j A) > >~ e (B j A) ; namely the executive's reputation improves whenever the optimal proposal is observed. Thus, independent of assembly actions, it is a unique best response for voters to reelect the executive conditional on the optimal policy being introduced.
If voters have not received feedback by elections time their behavior mirrors the case of no feedback. When the popular policy is proposed in period one voters' beliefs that the state is A and that the executive is congruent are reinforced and they reelect the incumbent executive with 3 5 Formally the expected probability of executive reelection in state s is given by:
Note that it depends on voters'as well as assemblies'strategies. 3 6 If in state A a congruent executive proposes the popular policy A with a probability that is positive but smaller than one then a noncongruent type will propose B with probability one and, conversely, if a noncongruent type proposes A it must be doing so with a probability smaller than one, since P fX > (Re + x)g > 0; and consequently a congruent type proposes A with probability one. probability one. If a B proposal has been made, however, voters'decision depends on the strength of their prior beliefs that they are in state A; or equivalently on the type of issue on the government agenda. If the issue is complex they reelect the executive with probability one; if they strongly believe that policy A is optimal then they are either indi¤erent or against giving the executive another term.
It is also worth pointing out an informational property of the direct delegation structure. Even though the assembly possesses superior information ahead of elections -it has learnt the statethis does not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome, i.e. the equilibrium outcome would be identical even if the assembly did not have this information. The reason why this occurs in my model is simply that the assembly does not have the opportunity to act in any way on this information. In some sense this information is lost and from this perspective the equilibrium outcome is ine¢ cient. We should observe, however, that even if the assembly had the option to make a public announcement regarding the state the equilibrium outcome would still remain una¤ected unless there was a way to make the announcement credibly.
I turn now to the game of hierarchical control. The arrival of information about the state triggers a con…dence vote before elections. According to the type of assembly behavior at the con…dence vote stage there are three types of perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. In a pooling equilibrium both assembly types make the same decision and this decision is the same across states. In a crosspooling equilibrium both assembly types pool on the same decision but the decision di¤ers across states: one crosspooling equilibrium is responsive, in the sense that the assembly votes as voters would vote if they had the information and authority (namely it reappoints if and only it the executive behaved optimally); the other is divergent from voters'interests, since reappointment is conditional on suboptimal behavior. Finally, there are two types of semiseparating equilibria in which congruent assemblies adopt voters'preferred decision while noncongruent assemblies mix between reappointment and dismissal in one of the states: if feedback is slow noncongruent assemblies mix in one state and vote according to their preferences in the other state; if feedback is faster noncongruent assemblies mix in one state and vote according to voter preferences in the other state. Of the three types only pooling equilibria exist for all parameter values. A su¢ cient condition for the responsive crosspooling equilibrium to exist is ' Proposition 5 In the game of hierarchical control with the possibility of an informed electorate the equilibrium can take two forms.
If the responsive crosspooling equilibrium does not exist the equilibrium is pooling. Congruent executives' behavior is optimal with probability one; noncongruent executives behave optimally if private bene…ts are below (R e + x) and are corrupt otherwise. At the …rst con…dence vote the incumbent executive is reappointed with probability one in both states.
If the responsive crosspooling equilibrium exists congruent executives behave optimally; noncongruent executives are responsive if their private bene…ts are below (R e + x) and are corrupt otherwise. At the …rst con…dence vote the assembly reappoints the executive if and only if his behavior was optimal at the policy stage.
At the con…dence vote stage of period one the two assembly types have opposite interests. If the executive behaved optimally a congruent assembly strictly prefers to reappoint, while a noncongruent type strictly prefers to dismiss the incumbent executive. However, separation cannot occur in equilibrium because it would imply that a noncongruent assembly cannot gain reelection and so it would deviate with positive probability to mimic a congruent type. 37 Thus, in equilibrium there must be a certain degree of pooling, some of these pooling strategies more conducive to voter satisfaction than others. The proposition says that if politicians think it su¢ ciently likely that voters are informed at elections time ' 1 Ra+1 assemblies can be induced to play an equilibrium that replicates voters'preferred executive reappointment rule they would use if they were perfectly informed about the state and had direct authority to remove the executive.
Since voters now observe the result of the assembly's con…dence vote along with the assembly's vote on policy, they can condition assembly reelection on the result of the con…dence vote. Why don't uninformed voters require the assembly to oust an executive for not choosing the popular policy? Actually this is a possible equilibrium. However it is dominated by another equilibrium in which voters, when uninformed, choose to give the assembly free hand over how to behave at the con…dence vote in period one. This latter equilibrium induces responsive executive behavior. It is supported by the following assembly reelection strategy used by voters:
-if not informed, reelect the assembly if and only if it votes on the executive's proposal as voters would vote themselves (and therefore regardless of the decision made at the con…dence stage);
-if informed, reelect the assembly if and only if it voted at the policy stage and at the con…dence stage as voters would vote themselves had they had the authority.
This reelection rule allows congruent assemblies to express their preferences without fear of electoral consequences and at the same time constrains noncongruent assemblies to use their dismissal power optimally.
To see this is an equilibrium suppose that a noncongruent assembly is in o¢ ce in period one and, on the basis of the information received about the state, has established that the executive is also noncongruent:~ e (z j s) = 0: The assembly then has the option to reappoint the executive, which results in a loss of o¢ ce if voters become informed, however if voters do not receive feedback the assembly stays in power and also sees its preferred policy implemented in period two. If it chooses to dismiss the executive then it will be reelected for doing what voters want but will have to content itself with the status quo under the new executive in period two. This tension is resolved in the interest of voters whenever:
which is precisely the su¢ cient condition for the existence of a responsive crosspooling equilibrium that achieves voters'preferred executive survival rule. 38 Interestingly, in a responsive crosspooling equilibrium the assembly does not have an incentive to revise the outcome of the …rst con…dence vote after elections passed. In a pooling equilibrium this is not the case. The executive is reappointed before elections but this decision is reversed by a congruent assembly in period two if the executive did in fact behave suboptimally in period one.
I now compare the normative properties of the equilibria discussed in this section. The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose the assembly becomes informed before elections about the e¤ ects of policy, and voters receive the same information with probability ' (0 ' < 1): If the responsive crosspooling equilibrium does not exist under hierarchical control then: 3 8 The necessary conditions for the existence of this equilibrium are '
for z = A; B: The second condition says that at the policy stage a noncongruent assembly must weakly prefer to pursue reelection over obtaining their preferred policy outcome in period one.
(a) for complex issues hierarchical control dominates direct control in terms of executive discipline and executive overall performance (but not in terms of selection); (b) for simple issues hierarchical control dominates direct control, if p is small or large; otherwise, there are tradeo¤ s: direct control has superior executive performance if the executive has moderate reelection concerns, and hierarchical control is superior for strong executive reelection concerns.
If the responsive crosspooling equilibrium does exist under hierarchical control then for both complex and simple issues hierarchical control dominates direct control in terms of executive discipline and executive overall performance.
When ' = 1 the two institutions are outcome-equivalent.
The superiority of hierarchical control for all issues when feedback is su¢ ciently fast should not be surprising. The responsive crosspooling equilibrium attains the upper bound on executive discipline that can be enforced by a principal under the informational constraints of the model: the executive behaves optimally for bene…ts below his reservation value (R e + x) and follows its preferences otherwise. Under direct control this bound is reached if and only if feedback is certain, ' = 1. I refer the reader to the appendix for a veri…cation of this claim and here I brie ‡y discuss the case of slow feedback when the responsive crosspooling equilibrium does not exist.
Under direct control executive performance with complex issues is increasing in the speed of feedback ' and is given by:
The corresponding expression under hierarchical control is:
The …rst term in each equation measures executive performance when executives pool on the optimal policy while the second term captures performance when there is separation by preferred policies. I observe that separation occurs earlier under direct control since
implying that H > D for all voter beliefs G and so hierarchical control dominates due to superior executive discipline in period one. With regard to simple issues, direct control cannot be dominant because if voters believe that the executive's private bene…ts cannot exceed (R e + x) (reelection concerns are strong) then hierarchical control is strictly superior. To see this note that for executive bene…ts below this value discipline is at its highest under this system, H 1 = 1; while under direct control either the noncongruent type panders or both types pander, resulting in a loss of discipline that cannot be compensated by a possibly superior selection of types into the second period. If the executive's outside o¢ ce bene…ts exceed (R e + x) (moderate reelection concerns) direct control features better executive discipline and poorer selection, but overall is strictly superior to hierarchical control if p is not too small or not too large.
Hierarchical Control with Partisanship
Some polities whose government is based on a hierarchical structure of delegation can see various degrees of collusion develop between the direct and the indirect agent, for instance between the legislative majority and the executive branch. Collusion may be sustained through several mechanisms. At the level of national politics the most common form of collusion is political partisanship. Leaders of political parties competing for executive power have access to instruments that can be used to secure the support of party members who win legislative seats, such as control over the funding of political campaigns or the right to selection and deselection of candidates for parliamentary elections (Strøm 2003) . Collusion can also arise as a consequence of executive procedural prerogatives, such as the con…dence vote procedure (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998) or the right to dissolve parliament and call for new elections. 39 Partisanship is empirically more prevalent under plurality rule, single member district, electoral systems which lead to the formation of only a few competitive parties. The parliamentary scene is then one in which the chief executive and his or her cabinet are often backed by a disciplined parliamentary majority of their own party. The prime example of this political environment is United Kingdom's majoritarian parliamentary system, also known as the Westminster model (Lijphart 1999) .
The fusion of executive and legislative powers was decried very early on in the modern history of democratic government by political activists and political scientists alike. In the United States the urban reform movement of the end of the nineteenth century proposed a model of city government with nonpartisan ballots, a hierarchical structure of delegation (from voters to city council to city manager), and at-large elections that were to be held separately from state and national elections. The leading premise of the reformers was that the root cause of corruption and machine politics in city halls across the country was partisan politics. In Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century Ostrogorski (1902) argued that the growing importance of parties as political actors undermined political accountability. He maintained that under a cohesive, party-based, parliamentary government the control of the executive is almost nonexistent since the responsibility of the members of parliament "disappears in that of the party" (page 714). In the language of my theoretical framework these views essentially claim that collusion between the branches of government fosters moral hazard. 40 In this section I use the model developed so far to explore the consequences of partisanship on executive accountability in a hierarchical monitoring structure. I adopt a simple, reduced-form, approach to modeling partisanship between executive and assembly. I assume that at the beginning of period one the assembly's and the executive's types are perfectly correlated and the assembly can, at a con…dence vote stage, dismiss the executive and replace him with an executive of its own type. I do not presume that a strict correlation of underlying preferences must exist between the two branches but rather that an (unmodeled) mechanism is in place that can induce one of the 3 9 The con…dence vote procedure should not be confused with the other institution of this paper, namely the vote of no con…dence or censure. The former is the prerogative of the chief executive to link the survival of the government to the approval by parliament of a particularly consequential policy measure. The latter is a constitutional prerogative of parliament to dismiss the executive "at virtually any time and for whatever reason they deem su¢ cient" (Strøm 2003 ).
4 0 A more recent example of public suspicion of the e¤ects of collusion between branches is this excerpt from the August 2005 ruling of Judge William Chandler, State of Delaware's Chancellor, in the case brought by Walt Disney Company's shareholders against the company's CEO Michael Eisner over a hiring decision. "... Eisner to a large extent is responsible for the failings in process that infected and handicapped the board's decision-making abilities. Eisner stacked his (and I intentionally write "his" as opposed to "the company's") board of directors with friends and other acquaintances who, though not necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and support him unconditionally than truly independent directors." branches to act as if it had the exact policy preferences of the other.
The presence of partisanship along the chain of delegation does a¤ect the equilibrium of this game and the qualitative change largely con…rms the views presented above. I …nd that partisanship decreases the level of discipline that can be enforced on noncongruent executive types by increasing the incidence of either pandering or corruption. Furthermore, this e¤ect is stronger the less likely voters are to become informed prior to elections. I also …nd that with partisanship noncongruent executives'incentives may lead them to pander to public opinion. In the case of no feedback this is the only form in which they respond to voter preferences. When the normative properties of the new equilibria are contrasted with those of the game of direct control, however, the instances in which hierarchical control unequivocally dominates direct control are now more limited.
I start with the case of no feedback before elections. The following proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 3 when there is partisanship in the political environment.
Proposition 7 Suppose assembly and executive types are perfectly correlated. Then:
(a) for complex issues hierarchical control dominates direct control in terms of executive discipline and overall executive performance (but not in terms of selection); (b) for simple issues hierarchical control dominates direct control in terms of executive discipline and executive overall performance if and only if p : When p > hierarchical control dominates direct control in terms of overall executive performance if p is su¢ ciently small. If p is large then direct control creates better executive performance for moderate reelection concerns, and hierarchical control produces better executive performance for strong reelection concerns.
Consider the following equilibrium under hierarchical control with partisanship. Congruent executives behave optimally with probability one; noncongruent executives pander when private bene…ts are below (G) (R e + x) ; where:
and act corruptly otherwise. The assembly approves all executive proposals. Voters reelect the assembly if and only if the executive proposed the popular policy A and the assembly approved it. At the con…dence vote stage in period two congruent assemblies, if reelected, reappoint the executive if and only if it behaved optimally in period one; noncongruent assemblies reappoint with probability (G) in state A and dismiss in state B if the executive behaved optimally, and in both states it reappoints with probability one if the executive did not behave optimally in period one. Newly elected assemblies do not reappoint the executive in either state. At the second policy stage the executive proposes its preferred policy and the assembly approves it. Unlike in the case of independent types here voters condition reelection of the government at least partly on executive actions because these reveal information about the executive and, due to the correlation of types, about voters'direct agent, the assembly. Any incumbent assembly, if reelected, is indi¤erent between reappointing the incumbent executive and dismissing it since the replacement can be chosen to be of the assembly's type.
However, the assembly's reappointment strategy does a¤ect its overall welfare in the game because it in ‡uences executive …rst period behavior and thus assembly …rst period payo¤s. An assembly faces the following tradeo¤. If it reappoints the executive with a high probability for responding to voters' preferences the executive will have a strong incentive to pander to voters thereby increasing the assembly's own chances of reelection; at the same time this strategy decreases the likelihood that the assembly's preferred policy is adopted in period one. If the assembly reappoints the executive with a low probability for being responsive to voters'preferences the executive's incentive to pander is reduced; the assembly obtains its preferred policy more frequently but its chances of staying in power are reduced. Several reappointment strategies, in which a congruent assembly punishes the executive for introducing A in state B and a noncongruent assembly punishes the executive for introducing A in state A; thus seem reasonable. 41 In the equilibrium above both types of assembly punish to some extent the executive for behaving in a manner that a¤ects assembly policy payo¤s.
A newly elected assembly can always expect its preferred policy outcome in period two by appointing an executive of its own type. For this reason a newly elected assembly can reappoint the incumbent executive in an equilibrium only if the incumbent' type was revealed within that state and is identical to that of the incoming assembly. This requires that at least one executive type chooses one policy with probability one in that state.
It is useful to compare this result with Proposition 3. There hierarchical control with independent types dominates both in terms of discipline and selection. In an environment with partisanship the comparative advantage of hierarchical control remains discipline because congruent executives are allowed to follow their preferences; however selection deteriorates because it is driven by an assembly reelection rule that requires that the popular policy be adopted. This reelection rule leads to the replacement of a congruent government in state B: Without partisanship this event cannot take place because in that environment voters condition reelection of the assembly exclusively on its voting behavior, which is responsive with probability one, and further the assembly conditions reappointment of the executive on optimal behavior. Thus the probability of a Type I error when types are independent is zero.
I now turn to the case of positive feedback in period one.
Proposition 8 If

(Ra+1)
' < 1 then: (a) for complex issues hierarchical control dominates direct control in terms of executive discipline and executive overall performance (but not in terms of selection); (b) for simple issues hierarchical control dominates direct control in terms of overall executive performance if p is small or is large. Otherwise, direct control is superior in terms of executive performance for moderate reelection concerns, and hierarchical control is superior for strong reelection concerns.
Consider the following equilibrium under hierarchical control with partisanship and the possibility of an informed electorate. Congruent executives behave optimally with probability one; noncongruent executives behave optimally if X < ' (R e + x) ; pander if ' (R e + x) < X < (G) (R e + x), where:
and are corrupt otherwise. The assembly approves all executive proposals. After learning the state the assembly reappoints the executive if and only if it introduced the optimal alternative. If voters have not received feedback they reelect the assembly if and only if the executive introduced the popular policy A and the assembly approved it. If voters are informed about the state they reelect the assembly if and only if the executive introduced the optimal policy and the assembly approved it. In period two a reelected congruent assembly reappoints the executive if and only if it introduced the optimal policy in period one; a reelected noncongruent assembly reappoints the executive with probability (G) in state A after proposal A and with probability one otherwise. A newly elected assembly does not reappoint the incumbent executive. At the second policy stage the executive proposes its preferred policy and the assembly approves it.
This equilibrium exists for all distributions G if and only if ' 1 (Ra+1) : The reason for this restriction is that if state B is very likely a noncongruent assembly may not …nd it in its interest to approve an executive proposal of B; thereby undoing the pooling that takes place at the voting stage in period one. Suppose the assembly knows the state is B: If B is proposed in period one the assembly is not going to be reelected for approving it unless this policy is optimal and voters have received feedback indicating so. However, if the assembly blocks B it will lose power for certain but is content with the status quo. The assembly then approves B when it knew the state were B if and only if ' [ 1 + (R a + 1)] + (1 ') ( 1) 0 thus mimicking the behavior of the congruent type.
Empirical Evidence
A central prediction of my model is that executive performance under direct control may be impaired by an incentive to bias public policy in a direction favored by public perceptions of what seems optimal policy. Moreover, I found that the incentive to pander to public opinion is stronger the less likely voters are to be informed at elections time. Irrespective of the welfare consequences of this type of executive behavior, however, the theoretical argument implies that in systems with a directly elected executive we should observe clearer attempts at promoting popular measures close to elections when compared to systems where the executive is answerable to an independent representative body. Here I test this hypothesis using panel data from a sample of 119 large U.S. cities over the period 1970-1997. My empirical strategy is to test for the presence of electoral cycles conditional on the accountability structure of local government.
Background
There are two major forms of municipal government in large U.S. cities, mayor-council and councilmanager, each of which …ts one of the two monitoring mechanisms analyzed in this paper. 42 In mayor-council government both the mayor and councilmembers are directly elected by residents. The mayor is the city's chief executive and usually serves a renewable term of up to four years. His administrative authority is complete and includes managing the budget, appointing and removing department heads and directing the organization of agency functions. At the same time the mayor heads the political and policymaking agenda and prepares the budget for council approval. The mayor is typically not a member of the council, however he may have the power to veto legislation produced by the council. The city council's primary role is to debate, amend and vote on the mayor's proposals. 43 4 2 Large cities are generally considered those having populations of over 100,000 residents. A third form of municipal government that can be found in large cities is the commission form. This form has been historically rare for cities in this category and has become even less common in recent years. In our sample only eight cities have been at some point during the period governed under this form.
In council-manager cities the council is directly elected and appoints a city manager who assumes executive responsibility for city administration. The manager can be replaced by the council at any time by a simple majority vote. Apart from his administrative duties the manager has a central role in the development of policy alternatives and is the main source of information on policy issues for the council. His policymaking powers include the preparation of the municipal budget and the appointment and removal of department heads. The city council is often elected at large on a nonpartisan ballot and members serve up to four year terms. Shorter terms of o¢ ce are concurrent while longer terms are often staggered. Its main functions are amending and voting on legislation and monitoring the city manager's o¢ ce. Some council-manager cities also have a directly elected mayor who is not however involved in city administration, rather he performs strictly ceremonial duties. 44 Since the early 1960s the increasing level of the crime rate has been a major political issue in large U.S. cities. This fact is evidenced by national opinion polls that have consistently ranked crime among the top concerns of U.S. citizens. Based on this I also argue that public safety has been a simple issue in this period (see de…nition above), since people must have felt strongly that a larger police force in the streets was good for their welfare. This means, in light of my model, that it o¤ered a strong incentive for elected mayors to please public opinion.
Management of police sta¤ is largely seen by the public as the responsibility of local authorities. Police departments in American cities are organized at the local level with spending on police protection taking a substantial share of the local budget. In mayor-council cities the mayor has the authority to devise a police personnel strategy as well as to appoint and remove the police chief. In cities with the council-manager system these powers belong to the city manager.
If the city's chief executive is held responsible for police performance in reducing crime, incumbents will have an incentive to maintain a large, and perhaps costly, police force either to prevent criminal incidents during their term or to project a clear anti-crime stance. In light of my model the incentive to increase police personnel is stronger in advance of elections since it may take time for citizens and the council to ascertain whether the hiring of extra police sta¤ was warranted. Levitt (1997) is the …rst study to document the existence of electoral cycles in police o¢ cer hiring in his analysis of a panel of 59 large U.S. cities over the period 1969-1992. His goal was to exploit the variation in police sta¢ ng induced by elections to identify the causal e¤ect of police on crime.
Although restricting the sample to cities where "the mayor is directly elected" (Levitt 1997 p. 272), only 36 of his cities were organized according to the mayor-council system at some point during the sample period. Of the remaining cities 21 were council-manager cities whose mayors, while directly elected, had no authority over police personnel, and two cities have had a commission form of government. I build on his analysis by:
(i) doubling the number of cities in the sample and extending the sample period; (ii) respecifying the empirical model to account for di¤erences in local political institutions; (iii) exploiting both across-cities and within-cities variation in political institutions. My goal is to test the hypothesis that electoral cycles in police sta¢ ng are larger in cities organized according to the mayor-council system. above is characterized by a similar fragmentation of power in that directly elected commissioners are each responsible for policymaking in and administration of a particular area of municipal activity. For a comprehensive discussion of forms of municipal government in the U.S. see Renner and DeSantis (1998) . 4 4 The council-manager system is the creation of the American urban reform movement of the end of the nineteenth century. Since it was …rst introduced in Stanton, Virginia in 1908, it has become a popular form of government in medium and large U.S. cities. In 2000, 63 percent of U.S. cities with populations of 25,000 or more have incorporated it in their charters. Several U.S. counties have also adopted this form of government as have municipalities in countries such as Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Germany. 
Data Description
I collected annual data on a panel of 119 historically large U.S. cities between 1970 and 1999. 45 An appendix section provides detailed references to my data sources. Summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical speci…cations are presented in Table 1 . Slightly over a half of all observations are cities with a council-manager form of government. Only a few cities have changed their form of government during the sample period, a feature of the data captured by the small within standard deviation of 0.084. There are on average approximately 227 sworn police o¢ cers for every 100,000 residents and they account for about 80 percent of total police employees. The average rate of growth in o¢ cer hiring was around 0.8 percent a year. During the sample period the average frequency of local elections was approximately one every 2.7 years. 46 The indicator variable for a local election takes the value one in a year with mayoral elections in mayor-council cities and a year with council elections in council-manager cities, and zero otherwise. 47 If the election takes place in the …rst half of the year, January through June, the previous year is coded as an election year, otherwise the current year is indicated. This choice is justi…ed by the fact that the size of the police force is recorded as of October 31 of each year. Thus I expect that any attempts by the executive to hire more o¢ cers would be made during a period of several months preceding the election and consequently will be re ‡ected in the police count taking place closest to the month of the election. 48 In addition to data on governmental form, elections and police personnel, I employ a number of demographic, …scal and economic control variables. City-level data on population and percent population black is collected every ten years by the U.S. Census Bureau. Population numbers are then estimated for intercensal years using demographic formulas. I use the annual population series available in the Historical Database on Local Government Finances which unfortunately are not always yearly i.e. in some years the population estimate of the previous year is reported. The percent of city population that is black is only available for census years and I use a linear interpolation for the remaining years. 49 I do not expect that these approximations will a¤ect the estimation results since demographic variables even in the U.S. have tended to evolve slowly.
Real personal income is measured in 1982-84 dollars using the consumer price index for all urban consumers and corresponds to the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) to which the city belongs. For cities that are not included in any of the MSA's de…ned by the U.S. Department of Commerce I use the income per capita series for the state's nonmetropolitan statistical area. Fiscal data is available annually at the city level. I use two variables to control for ‡uctuations in a city's …scal strength. 50 Total taxes consist of revenues to the local budget generated through local taxation of residents and business. Total revenues is income collected from own sources and received as intergovernmental (state and federal) grants. Table 2 presents mean values, standard deviations and p-values for tests of the null hypothesis that the means of the variables in the leftmost column are equal in the two groups of observations identi…ed by form of government. I …nd several patterns. First, mayor-council cities in my sample have signi…cantly larger mean populations than council-manager cities as well as larger proportions of black residents. Second, mayor-council cities belong to metropolitan areas with on average 4.5 percent larger average incomes per capita. Another signi…cant di¤erence is the seemingly better ability of mayor-council cities to raise taxes, with 418.98 real dollars per capita compared to only 301.38 real dollars per capita in council-manager cities. The same comparison holds for the aggregate pool or revenues. Third, more than half of mayoral elections in mayor-council cities take place at intervals of four years, whereas less than half of council elections in council-manager cities are organized every four years. The typical electoral institution in the latter type of cities is four-year staggered terms for every councilmember, with half of the council being up for reelection every two years.
Empirical Speci…cation and Estimation Results
I also …nd signi…cant di¤erences across government forms when I look at measures of police employment. Mayor-council cities have larger average numbers of police o¢ cers per capita than council-manager cities. However, in terms of growth rates, the means are statistically indistinguishable. Both types of cities increased their sworn police personnel at an average rate of about 0.7 percent each year during the sample period. 51 When I further compare means conditional on 4 9 To obtain the interpolated series we include the 2000 census data together with the other three censuses that were conducted during the sample period: 1970, 1980, 1990.
5 0 There is a large literature on political budget cycles that …nds evidence suggesting that governments use …scal policy for electoral purposes. At the city level, Veronese (2003) …nds that in Italian cities run by mayors tax cuts are disproportionately concentrated in the year preceding the election. In cross-country data Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Brender and Drazen (2004) …nd evidence of …scal cycles whose magnitudes do not, however, depend on the form of government. To the extent that such broad …scal cycles are present and that a city's …scal strength is correlated with its ability to hire more police sta¤ it is important to control for this e¤ect. However, we did not …nd any evidence for the presence of …scal cycles in aggregate budget items in our data. 5 1 It is perhaps interesting to note that this rate of increase has not kept pace with the trend in crime rates. Violent crime, the fastest growing type of crime, has more than doubled between 1970 and 1997. the presence of a local election I discover the pattern of di¤erential pre-electoral behavior that my model predicts. In an electoral year mayor-council cities see a larger increase in the number of of…cers per capita compared to a nonelectoral year. Moreover, the average hiring rate is signi…cantly larger than the one recorded in council-manager cities. I now investigate the robustness of this pattern by accounting for factors that might be correlated both with the timing of elections and with the hiring decisions of local governments, such as the …scal strength of city government or the state of the local economy. Formally, I estimate the following linear regression model:
where i is a city index, t is a time index, Y it is the number of police o¢ cers per 100,000 city residents, M it is an indicator variable equal to one if city i had a mayor-council form of government in year t, and zero otherwise, E it is an election year indicator, w it is a vector of demographic, economic and …scal controls as well as city size indicators, t is a time …xed e¤ect, i is a city …xed e¤ect and " it is an error term. I assume that the error terms are independent across cities but not necessarily within cities. Note that 1 measures the average di¤erence in responsiveness to elections between a mayor-council city and a council-manager city. The testable hypothesis is that 1 is positive. Table 3 presents regression estimates of several speci…cations of equation (35) . Below each estimate I report White standard errors clustered by cities, which are robust to autocorrelation within cities. The …rst column is the most parsimonious speci…cation including only year indicators as covariates. The estimated di¤erence in responsiveness to elections is positive and signi…cant at the one percent level (the p-value is 0.001); the point estimates predict that mayoral election years are associated with an average of 3.14 extra police o¢ cers per hundred thousand residents compared to nonelectoral years. On the other hand, council-manager cities seem to have hired less o¢ cers in electoral years compared to nonelectoral years, although this di¤erence is substantively small, around 0.7 percent a year. The model in column two introduces the …scal, economic and demographic controls described in the previous subsection; the impact on the estimated electoral e¤ects is negligible. The model in column three controls for time-invariant sources of heterogeneity across cities by adding city …xed e¤ects to the speci…cation in column two. This modi…cation has very little e¤ect on the estimated values of the coe¢ cients of interest. The estimated di¤erence in responsiveness increases marginally in value and maintains its strong signi…cance. The coe¢ cient on the mayor variable increases in absolute magnitude suggesting that mayors have hired less police per capita on average in nonelectoral years when compared to managers.
Column four presents …xed e¤ects estimation results that allow the electoral e¤ects to be cityspeci…c. This implies that the di¤erence in responsiveness to elections is identi…ed exclusively from cities that switched from one form of government to the other. 52 The estimated di¤erence in responsiveness is up to 16.81 o¢ cers per hundred thousand residents, which is equivalent to an average 6.9 percent annual increase. This di¤erence is signi…cant at the one percent level (the p-value is 0.008). The model in column …ve allows for a more general speci…cation in which the intercept of the partial electoral e¤ects are also city-speci…c. There is a slight increase in the estimate of 1 and a small increase in its standard error, leaving the estimate signi…cant at the …ve percent level (the p-value is 0.011). 53 In column six I build on the speci…cation in column …ve by controlling for an overall trend in responsiveness to elections that might have a¤ected all cities. Since all cities that switched form of government did so from a council-manager to a mayor-council form, one might be concerned that the positive estimate for 1 in the previous two models captures an increase in responsiveness in all cities in the latter part of the sample period. The estimation results suggest that this is not the case; the gap between responsiveness to elections in the two types of cities goes up to 19.66 o¢ cers per hundred thousand residents. In fact, I expect that responsiveness must have gone down in the more recent years due to the relative decrease in the rate of crime. The larger estimate from this model is consistent with this expectation. Finally, in the last column I augment the model in column six with city-speci…c trends in police hiring. The results of interest are not a¤ected by this modi…cation, although the …t of the model is substantially improved. 54 I conclude that the estimation results support my model's prediction that direct accountability of the city's chief executive creates the incentive to pander to the electorate ahead of elections, an e¤ect that should be muted or absent when the executive is responsible to the city council. 55 5 2 There are eight cities that changed their form of government close to the middle of the sample period. Two other cities changed their charters at the end of the period. 5 3 The larger estimates resulting from within-city variation may capture a short-term e¤ect. If voters learn slowly that mayors manipulate policy around elections they will be more likely to fall prey to it when the mayor-council form is new to them. 5 4 We should also observe that the variation in o¢ cer hiring induced by elections, or the other controls, is small. This is perhaps not surprising since the decisions to hire are most probably driven by the incidence of crime. 5 5 Results using the growth rate as the dependent variable are equally strong and are available upon request.
Conclusion
The relative merits of alternative institutions for disciplining and selecting public o¢ cials is an important yet little studied issue in political economy. This paper has made a step towards understanding how two basic accountability structures work to reduce the agency loss inherent in any delegation relationship in which the motives and actions of the representatives cannot be completely known by the principals. At …rst sight, a hierarchical accountability structure seems to only take us further away from the ideal "government by the people" conception of democracy, as it reduces voters'ability to hold the executive accountable for its policy choices. I have developed a political agency model to show that this particular institutional con…guration can in fact achieve superior de facto accountability despite the additional agency problem that arises between the executive and the assembly. The key to this conclusion is a close look at the e¤ects of the informational asymmetries between principals and their agents. When the executive has policy expertise and voters have few opportunities (or incentives) to acquire information the electoral mechanism can sometimes work against voters' interests by distorting the incentives of congruent politicians. This points to the need for institutions whose performance relies less on voter involvement. One prominent alternative is hierarchical control: voters delegate executive control to a representative body that is better informed than themselves. To isolate the e¤ect of the accountability structure on executive behavior I abstracted from other institutional di¤erences. Finally the paper presents evidence that directly elected executives pander more to public opinion than appointed executives when policy issues are simple, as predicted by the model.
My results support the view that political agency problems are only partially resolved through the mechanism of competitive elections. As we have seen part of the logic from existing electoral models with a single politician and a single voter extends to my framework and part of it does not. This alone suggests that a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between voters and their representatives could be gained by augmenting the standard principal-agent framework with the …ner institutional details of this relationship. Then we can address more rigorously the question of how di¤erent constitutional rules shape public choices.
To make further progress in this direction one could extend my analysis along several dimensions. First, removing the restriction to two periods would allow an analysis of the e¤ects of term limits on executive behavior. At the level of national politics, although there is great variation in the restrictions placed on politicians'term lengths, a common arrangement is to limit chief executives to two terms and impose no limits on the term lengths of legislators. It would be feasible to adapt my framework in order to understand the desirability of such restrictions on tenure. Second, enriching the policy space would permit an analysis of issues that were ignored in this paper. How do voters behave when they care about several aspects of public policy? Are they able to disentangle responsibility for each issue that a¤ects their welfare? How should decision powers be allocated among branches in order to maximize accountability for outcomes? A larger policy space would also allow the application of the model to speci…c public policy decisions such as …scal policy and foreign policy.
A third extension would be to relax the assumption of an exogenous pool of candidates. The process of candidate selection is not random but is in large part itself determined by the institutional structure of government. Political parties may also play an important role in selecting candidates for high o¢ ce and in holding them accountable thereafter. Fourth, the information structure itself may be endogenous to the accountability structure. Perhaps when voters are empowered to hold the executive directly accountable they expend more e¤ort in becoming informed. These and other extensions are natural directions for future research.
as:
However, using equation (38) we can see that (A; 1) = (B; 1) and so we can conclude that state-types (A; 1) and (B; 1) have equally strong incentives to propose A: In terms of their strategies this observation can be expressed as:
Analogously, executive state-types (B; 1) and (A; 1) have the same incentives to introduce bill A. Furthermore, their incentives are weaker than those of state-types (A; 1) and (B; 1) because
We conclude that (A; 1) = (B; 1) > (B; 1) = (A; 1) :
We next claim that if the executive's prior reputation is maintained or improves, the best response of voters is to reelect the executive regardless of the actions taken by the assembly. By contrast, if the executive's prior reputation deteriorates, i.e. falls below ; voters may or may not reelect him depending on their beliefs about the assembly's type.
First, we show that an executive's reputation strengthens if the popular policyA is proposed and weakens otherwise. The equilibrium beliefs that the executive is congruent given that a proposal A; respectively B; was made at the beginning of period one are:
and~
Observe that
the last inequality of which, by equation (45) 
It is useful to record at this point a result that will be important later, namely that, by equation (49) and > 1 2 , in the second period congruent assemblies will approve, and noncongruent assemblies will block, the submitted proposal if it was learnt that in period one the executive behaved optimally. Finally we observe that as long as the assembly's reputation remains above average, it is optimal for voters to reelect an executive that introduced the popular policy A: Voters'expected payo¤ from reelecting both the executive and the assembly is larger than the expected payo¤ from reelecting only the assembly:~
The …rst inequality is immediate if we observe that the term min f2~ e (A j B) 1; 0g receives weight We can then conclude that if~ a (A; v) then reelecting both or only the executive are optimal responses for voters, whereas if~ a (A; v) < voters reelect the executive only. We have thus shown that in any equilibrium voters necessarily reelect the executive for introducing the popular policy A regardless of the assembly's vote on this bill:
By equations (38), (41) and (42) it then follows that executive state-types (A; 1) and (B; 1) will always propose the popular policy:
The executive's posterior reputation after proposing the unpopular policy becomes, by equation (47):~
Proposal strategies of executive state-types (B; 1) and (A; 1) depend on voters'reelection rule after seeing an unpopular policy proposed. If
the executive is reelected regardless of his proposal thus (B; 1) = 0; if (56) does not hold he is not reelected for proposing B and then (B; 1) = G [ (R e + x)] : Finally we characterize behavior at the policy stage in period two. Since~ e (A j A) > and e (B j B) = 1 congruent assemblies approve, and noncongruent assemblies block, the executive's proposal if it behaved optimally in period one. Since~ e (B j A) = 0 congruent assemblies block, and noncongruent assemblies approve, the incumbent's second period proposal if the state was revealed to have been A after a …rst period proposal B: In equilibria with no distortion of congruent types' behavior we have~ e (A j B) = 0 and the second period strategy for voting on policy is as before. If congruent types pander with positive probability then~ e (A j B) = 
Proof of Proposition 2
At the second policy stage the executive faces no electoral constraint and will propose his preferred policy regardless of the state. The assemblies'responses thus only depend on their beliefs about the executive's type: if the incumbent has won all previous con…dence votes his proposal is approved by a congruent assembly, and blocked by a noncongruent assembly, if and only if his reputation is above a half; if a new executive has been appointed at the beginning of period two his bill will be approved by a congruent assembly but blocked by a noncongruent assembly. Assembly voting behavior at the …rst policy stage is similar to that under direct control: both assembly types approve the proposal with equal probability and voters are indi¤erent between reelecting the assembly and not reelecting. See the proof of Proposition 1.
We next show that the reputation of an executive who proposed the optimal policy in period one necessarily strengthens. First, note that a congruent executive is more likely than a noncongruent type to propose the optimal policy in either state. If as before (s; e ) denotes the change in the executive's expected payo¤ generated by a deviation from proposing B to proposing A, we have:
where
is the ex ante probability that the executive is reappointed for proposing policy z in state s: From equation (57) (A; 1) > (A; 1) implying that the probability that a congruent type proposes A in state A is larger than the corresponding probability for a noncongruent type (A; 1) > (A; 1) :Analogously, observing that (B; 1) < (B; 1) leads to the conclusion that (B; 1) > (B; 1) : Given these incentives, assemblies equilibrium beliefs about the executive's type will be revised to re ‡ect the greater propensity of congruent executives to introduce optimal policies. Upon their learning the state at the beginning of period two assemblies update their beliefs in the direction of more con…dence that the executive is of the congruent type if it was learnt that the …rst bill was optimal and less con…dence otherwise: 
At the con…dence vote stage of period two congruent assemblies will then reappoint the executive if and only if its behavior was optimal whereas noncongruent assemblies strictly prefer to reappoint an executive whose behavior was suboptimal but are indi¤erent between reappointing and dismissing an executive that behaved optimally. There are thus multiple equilibria depending on the choice of noncongruent assemblies at the con…dence vote stage. The equilibrium that maximizes executive performance is the one in which noncongruent assemblies reappoint an executive that behaved optimally.
We can now solve for executive equilibrium behavior at the beginning of period one. The equilibrium probabilities that the executive proposes policy A by executive state-type are:
(B; 1) = 1 (A; 1) :
Note that congruent executives' behavior su¤ers no distortion whereas noncongruent types are responsive to the electorate's preferences with positive probability (A; 1) and act corruptly if current bene…ts are large. The beliefs that are consistent with these equilibrium executive proposal strategies are then found by making the necessary substitutions in equations (59) -(62). We infer that at the …rst policy stage the executive's posterior reputation improves if the popular policy is introduced and weakens otherwise:
e (B) =
At the beginning of the second period, upon learning the state, assemblies'beliefs are given by:
e (A j B) =~ e (B j A) = 0:
Note that the executive's type is completely revealed following a suboptimal proposal. The implication for second period assembly behavior at the policy stage is that if the incumbent executive survived the no con…dence vote a congruent assembly blocks, and a noncongruent assembly approves, with probability one the second period bill if the …rst period bill was learnt to have been suboptimal.
Proof of Proposition 3
See section three.
Proof of Proposition 4
At the second policy stage executives propose their preferred policies. If the incumbent was not reelected, congruent assemblies approve, and noncongruent assemblies block, the proposal of the newly elected executive. If the incumbent was reelected congruent assemblies approve, and noncongruent assemblies block, his second period proposal if and only if~ e (z 1 j s 1 ) 1 2 : Now consider the …rst period. In any equilibrium it must be that both assembly types approve the executive's proposal with equal probability. To see this consider the subgame starting after a proposal A: 57 Suppose the congruent type were to approve A more often than the noncongruent type. Then, because~ e (A) > >~ e (B) voters would reelect if and only if A were approved. Then a noncongruent assembly will choose to approve A because it yields for him
which is positive, even if he thinks A is the optimal policy,.by assumption (5) . This however is in in contradiction to the supposition that the congruent type approves A more often. Similarly, if the congruent type were to approve A less often than a noncongruent type, then voters would reelect if and only if A were blocked which will prompt a noncongruent type to block A with probability one, a contradiction. We conclude that in any equilibrium~ a (z; v j s) =~ a (z; v) = for all z; v; s and voters are indi¤erent between reelecting the assembly or not. 58 We next argue that when voters have feedback they reelect the executive if and only if it introduced the optimal policy in period one. Consider executives in state A: They propose A if (A; e ) > 0 where:
Note, however, that (A; 1) (A; 1) = 2X > 0 which implies, by full support of the distribution of X, that in state A the congruent type proposes A more often than the noncongruent type:
(A; 1) > (A; 1) and voters will consequently respond by reelecting the executive if and only if A; the optimal policy, was proposed. Similarly
implies (B; 1) (B; 1) = 2X < 0 and therefore (B; 1) < (B; 1) and voters reelect if and only if B; the optimal policy, was proposed in state B: Assembly posterior beliefs about the incumbent's type then satisfy:~ e (z j s) > i¤ z = s:
Two immediate implications of this voting behavior are (A; 1) (B; 1) (with equality i¤ ' = 0) and (B; 1) (A; 1) (with equality i¤ ' = 0) which are su¢ cient to conclude that in any equilibrium proposing the popular policy results in posterior beliefs that place larger probability on state A :
It remains to determine voters'reelection rules when they do not have feedback and executives' proposal strategies in period one. For this we need to make a simple but important observation. Suppose that after a …rst period proposal z the executive's reputation did not weaken~ e (z) : Then we claim that the executive must in equilibrium be reelected with probability one regardless 5 8 The equilibrium that voters prefer is the one in which both assemblies pool on the strategy: approve A if and only ifp (A) of the assembly's vote. This follows because:
Intuitively, the …rst inequality simply says that, as long as the assembly is more likely to be congruent than noncongruent, having an informed assembly with veto power over the executive's decisions leads to greater voter welfare than if the assembly were not informed. Note also that even if~ e (z) = voters strictly prefer to reelect the executive, despite the fact that they may have to replace the assembly. This is because the information generated by the executive's …rst period proposal is valuable by making it easier for congruent assemblies to check executive proposal power in the second period. We now show that~ e (A) > >~ e (B) in all equilibria. Suppose this were not true. Theñ
and, by the previous argument, the executive is reelected with probability one for introducing policy B regardless of the assembly vote on it. Since e (B) = 1; the following are the equilibrium proposal strategies of each executive state-type:
Note that (A; 1) + (B; 1) 1 and either 0 (A; 1) < (A; 1) = 1 or 0 = (A; 1) < (B; 1) (A; 1) 1: In both cases we have
which implies~ e (B) < ; a contradiction to my supposition. We conclude that in all equilibriã e (A) > >~ e (B) and when voters do not have feedback they reelect the executive with probability one for introducing the popular policy. As in Proposition 1 this reelection rule creates strong incentives to pander if the probability of feedback is low enough. From equation (72) it follows immediately that (A; 1) = 1 and so~ e (B j A) = 0:
Voters' strategy for reelecting an executive that proposed B when they do not have feedback can take several forms depending on the parameters of the model. If feedback is slow, 0 ' < 
These equilibria require that
wherep
Second, voters reelect the executive with probability e (B) ; where 0 e (B) < 1 2' 1 ' ; and executives'proposal strategies are:
Note that while in the …rst kind of equilibrium the behavior of congruent executives is not distorted, in the second kind of equilibrium both executive types pander with positive probability. Finally if 1 2 ' 1; voters without feedback reelect an executive that proposed the unpopular policy with probability e (B) (in the case ' = 1 this strategy is not needed) and executives proposal strategies are the same as in equations (84)-(87). The equilibria in which e (B) = 1 are interesting because the executive is reelected with probability one despite the fact that its reputation is weaker that that of its challenger. This is rational because voters'payo¤ for the next period is not solely dependent of the executive's expected quality but also on the assembly's information about the executive's type.
In the second period the vote on a reelected executive's proposal is determined by the assemblies' posterior beliefs about the executive's type. Since~ e (A j A) ;~ e (B j B) > congruent assemblies approve, and noncongruent assemblies block, the executive's proposal if it behaved optimally in period one. Since~ e (B j A) = 0 congruent assemblies block, and noncongruent assemblies approve, the incumbent's second period proposal if the state was revealed to have been A after a …rst period proposal B: In equilibria with no distortion of congruent types' behavior we have~ e (A j B) = 0 and the second period strategy for voting on policy is as before. If congruent types pander with positive probability then~ e (A j B) = 
Proof of Proposition 5
Behavior in the second period is identical to the case of an uninformed assembly. Upon learning the state congruent assemblies reappoint the executive if and only if its …rst period bill proved optimal. Noncongruent assemblies reappoint the executive regardless of its behavior. The executive then proposes his preferred policy. This proposal is approved by a congruent assembly and blocked by a noncongruent assembly if and only if~ e (z 1 j s 1 ) 1 2 : Since voters cannot elect the executive branch their only concern at election time is with the type of assembly that will control the executive in the second period. We …rst solve the subgame starting after a proposal has been made by the executive in period one. The equilibria of these two subgames together with the results of the second con…dence vote determine the reappointment rule that the executive faces in equilibrium.
Suppose policy z was proposed in the …rst period and that in equilibrium congruent assemblies approve z more often than noncongruent types. Then, for all values of the probability of feedback '; and regardless of the results of the subsequent con…dence vote, voters replace the assembly for blocking z : a (z; N; c) = a (z; N; c j s) = 0 for c = Y; N and s = A; B: To establish this claim we show that neither a (z; N; c j s) > 0 nor a (z; N; c) > 0 can be equilibrium strategies. Without loss of generality consider the case c = Y .
Suppose a (z; N; Y j s) > 0. Then it must be that~ a (z; N; Y j s) and the executive must be replaced with positive probability in state s after z is blocked. This implies~ a (z; N; N j s) < and therefore a (z; N; N j s) = 0: Now if in equilibrium a (z; N; N ) = 0 then we reach a contradiction because z; N; N cannot be chosen with positive probability in state s: Thus for an equilibrium it must be that a (z; N; N ) > 0: But this implies that~ a (z; N; N ) and that the executive must be reappointed with positive probability in at least one state after z is blocked. This further requires that~ a (z; N; Y ) < and therefore a (z; N; Y ) = 0 and since~ a (z; N; Y j s) it must also be that~ a (z; N; Y j s 0 ) < and a (z; N; Y j s) = 0; where s 0 6 = s: These two, however imply that z; N; Y cannot be chosen in state s 0 ; or equivalently that
Suppose a (z; N; Y ) > 0: This implies~ a (z; N; Y ) and the executive must be replaced with positive probability after z is blocked in either state A or in state B: Thus, since~ a (z; N; N ) < ; it must be that a (z; N; N ) = 0: Now if in equilibrium a (z; N; N j A) = a (z; N; N j B) = 0 then z; N; N cannot be chosen with positive probability in equilibrium. At least one of the state dependent reelection probabilities has to be positive. Suppose, without loss of generality that a (z; N; N j A) > 0: Then~ a (z; N; N j A)
; but since~ a (z; N; N ) < it must be that a (z; N; N j B) < and so a (z; N; N j B) = 0: But this means that z; N; N cannot be chosen in state B: Therefore ~ a (z; N; N j A) =~ a (z; N; N ) < ; a contradiction. This establishes the claim.
Based on this observation we can now infer that if A was proposed in period one and state A is believed to be more likely than state B there are no equilibria where a congruent assembly blocks A more often than the noncongruent assembly. This follows since, by the previous claim, reelection is not possible for approving A: However, this means that a noncongruent assembly will block A with probability one, in other words at least as often as the congruent assembly. Symmetrically, if A was proposed and state B is believed to be more likely than state A there do not exist equilibria where the congruent assembly approves A more often than the noncongruent assembly.
Consider, without loss of generality, the subgame that begins after a proposal A and supposẽ p (A) > 1 2 : There are three types of equilibria: pooling, crosspooling and semiseparating. There are two pooling equilibria: …rst, both assembly types approve A and then reappoint the executive regardless of the state; second, both assembly types approve A and then replace the executive regardless of the state. Similarly there are two crosspooling equilibria: …rst, both assembly types approve A and then reappoint the executive in state A and replace it in state B; second, both assembly types approve A and then replace the executive in state A and reappoint it in state B: Pooling equilibria exist for all parameter values. A su¢ cient condition for the …rst crosspooling equilibrium to exist is 1 Ra+1 ' 1: Semiseparating equilibria can be of two forms. If the probability of feedback is low, 0 ' < 1 2(Ra+1) ; then congruent assemblies approve A with probability one and reappoint with probability one if and only if the proposal matches the state; noncongruent assemblies approve A with positive probability and at the con…dence vote mix in state A and reappoint in state B: If voters have feedback they reelect the assembly if and only if it approved A and reappointed only when the proposal matched the state. If voters do not have feedback they reelect with probability one if the executive is replaced and with probability ; congruent assemblies approve A with probability one and reappoint with probability one if and only if the proposal matches the state; noncongruent assemblies approve A with positive probability and at the con…dence vote reappoint in state A and mix in state B: If voters have feedback they reelect the assembly if and only if it approved A and reappointed only when the proposal matched the state. If voters do not have feedback they reelect with probability one if the executive is replaced and with probability Ra (1 ')(Ra+1) if the executive is reappointed.
The executives'proposal strategies that correspond to the …rst pooling equilibrium are: 
The executives'proposal strategies that correspond to the …rst crosspooling equilibrium are: 
Note that in either case neither executive type behaves opportunistically: congruent types behave optimally while noncongruent types behave either optimally or corruptly.
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose ' < 1 and the responsive crosspooling equilibrium exists under hierarchical control. When X < (R e + x) both executive types behave optimally under hierarchical control. Discipline is then maximal: H 1 = 1: Under direct control the executive behaves nonoptimally with positive probability, either by pandering or by being corrupt, and therefore D 1 < 1: When X > (R e + x) both executive types follow their preferences in each system and discipline is D 1 = H 1 = 2 1: We conclude that hierarchical control is superior for all full support distributions G; since G [ (R e + x)] > 0:
We now compare the systems in terms of overall executive performance. Consider …rst the case X < (R e + x) : Under hierarchical control the executive behaves optimally and performance is H = 2 : Under direct control there are four types of behavior, at least two occurring with positive probability. First, both executive types behave optimally and so D = 2 : Second, a congruent type behaves optimally and a noncongruent type panders; in this case performance is: 
and is strictly smaller than 2 : Finally, suppose that X > (R e + x) : Under both systems the executive follows its preferences. Relative performance then turns on how well each system achieves selection. 
It can be easily veri…ed that D 2 < H 2 for all parameter values. If ' = 1 the two systems yield the same equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, the implicit executive survival rule is identical. It follows that no system is dominant in this case.
Proof of Proposition 7
For complex issues discipline is higher under hierarchical control if X < (G) (R e + x) because the noncongruent executive panders instead of following its preferences: 
When X > (G) (R e + x) the executive follows its preferences in each system and discipline is consequently the same. It thus follows that D 1 < H 1 for all full support distributions G: Overall executive performance for complex issues is given, respectively, by: 
and under hierarchical control it is:
where (G) is de…ned in equation (33) . Since (G) > 0 we have that D It can be veri…ed that p is a su¢ cient condition in order to have D < H for all G: The dominance of hierarchical control according to this criterion remains true if p > but p remains su¢ ciently small. Otherwise, neither institution is dominant because if X < (G) (R e + x) hierarchical control is superior due to the better discipline (instead of pandering a congruent executive can behave optimally without electoral consequences) and if (G) (R e + x) < X < (R e + x) direct control is superior also due to higher discipline.
Proof of Proposition 8
We …rst show that (G) > ': To see this note that
is increasing in and~ e (A) j =' > : By full support of G there exists a^ > ' such that e (A) j =^ : Then (G) ; de…ned to be the largest such ; must itself be larger than ': Suppose ' < 1: Direct control cannot dominate hierarchical control in terms of overall executive performance because if voters believe that executive private bene…ts are below (G) (R e + x) and for these beliefs the equilibrium outlined in section …ve exists, then hierarchical control is superior by inducing the executive to behave optimally and yields performance H = 2 : Under direct control at least one type panders with positive probability. If only the noncongruent type panders then:
If both the congruent and the noncongruent types pander then
In both cases we have D < 2 and therefore hierarchical control is strictly superior at these beliefs. Now suppose that the equilibrium of section …ve exists for all distributions G: A necessary and su¢ cient condition for this to happen is that ' 
We see that under each system respectively. Hierarchical control dominates because in the middle interval it is superior due to higher discipline: the noncongruent type panders whereas under direct control it acts corruptly.
Data Sources
The variables come from several sources. City-level population series are from the Historical Database on Individual Government Finances 
